Socio-Legal Review
Volume 3

Issue 1

Article 5

September 2022

Facing the Demons of the Past: Transitional Justice in Gujarat
Ameya Kilara

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.nls.ac.in/slr

Recommended Citation
Kilara, Ameya (2022) "Facing the Demons of the Past: Transitional Justice in Gujarat," Socio-Legal Review:
Vol. 3: Iss. 1, Article 5.
Available at: https://repository.nls.ac.in/slr/vol3/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Socio-Legal Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact library@nls.ac.in.

Vol. 3

Socio-Legal Review

2007

FACING THE DEMONS OF THE PAST: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN GUJARAT
Ameya Kilara**
Scholars of transitional justice have recently suggested that our understanding
of transitions need not be restricted to societies moving from authoritarian
regimes to democracy. In fact, “non-paradigm transitions” occur in
purportedly democratic states as well, in the aftermath of large-scale and
State-sanctioned violations of human rights. This article focuses on one such
non-paradigm transition occurring in the state of Gujarat in India post the
2002 communal carnage. The author proposes that in addition to retributive
responses to the human rights violations, a Truth and Reconciliation
Commission should be seriously considered as a means of effecting a real
transition to peace in Gujarat.

Introduction
The end of World-War II heralded a new era for the growth of human rights
concerns and discourses. The international eye, obsessed in the past with wars
and conflicts between states, came to acknowledge the seriousness of more
“domestic” conflicts along ethnic, racial or religious lines, involving massive
violations of human rights, as matters of international concern.1 With this
evolved “transitional justice”-an ever-expanding field of academic and policy
interest that studies a range of approaches that societies undertake to reckon
with legacies of widespread or systematic human rights abuse, as they move
from a period of violent conflict or oppression towards peace and democracy.2
A ‘transition’ conveys the idea of a journey, and by extension, the idea that
there is a starting point and a final destination. Antinomies are thus central to
the concept of a transition. “Transitional justice” invariably deals with
“paradigm transitions”- transitions from authoritarian rule to democratic
regimes, for instance, Latin American states shifting from military to civil rule,
the change from apartheid to majority rule in South Africa, and Eastern and
Central European states in post-communist flux.3 These, and other similarly
**

3rd year, B.A., LL.B. (Hons.), National Law School of India University, Bangalore.

For example, the conflicts and consequent human rights violations in Sri Lanka, Iraq, South
Africa, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and several other situations of conflict that do not involve
states inter se are all instances of the internationalization of domestic disputes.
1

See generally, The International Centre for Transitional Justice, What is Transitional Justice,
http://www.ictj.org/en/tj/.
2

Neil J. Kritz, Coming to Terms with Atrocities: Review of the Accountability Mechanisms
for Mass Violation of Human Rights, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127 (1996) [hereinafter
Kritz].
3
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placed societies, have evolved several mechanisms including international
tribunals, truth commissions, and traditional justice delivery systems, to deal
with the violence that characterized previous authoritarian regimes. Scholars
have recently argued for a more nuanced understanding of the transitional
process by conceptually separating war/peace transitions from illiberal
polity/democracy transitions.4 In other words, they ask for an unbundling of
the dual antinomies that are characteristic of “paradigm transitions”. This
essentially calls for a broadening of the discourse of transitional justice to
include transitions from violent conflict (ethnic, racial or religious) to peace
within broadly “democratic” states as well.
This article focuses on one such non-paradigm transition in the state of
Gujarat in India, one of the largest democracies in the world. In 2002, Gujarat
witnessed large scale communal violence directed against the Muslim minority
in which the state itself was complicit.5 The carnage was portrayed as a
“spontaneous reaction” to the burning of a train at Godhra in which 59 men,
women and children perished, most of them Hindu kar sevaks.6 In fact, the
program was a planned and systematic attack, in which 2000 people were
killed in less than 72 hours.7 Several independent organizations have
definitively stated that the scale and nature of the state-facilitated attacks on the
minority community in Gujarat suffice to legally label the carnage as
Colm Campbell et al, The Paradox of Transition in Conflicted Democracies, 27(2) HUM.
RTS. Q. 174 (2005) [hereinafter Campbell].
4

PEOPLE’S UNION FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES, AN INTERIM REPORT TO THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMISSION
(2002),
available
at
http://www.pucl.org/Topics/Religioncommunalism/2002/gujarat-nhrc-submission.htm [hereinafter PUCL REPORT]
5

6

The U.C. Bannerjee Committee was appointed by the Central Government (Railway
Ministry) in September 2004 to probe the Godhra train carnage. The Committee in its report
found that the fire in the railway coach was "accidental, possibly caused by short circuiting.''
The Gujarat High Court in October 2006 held the constitution of the U. C. Bannerjee
Committee by the Railway Ministry to probe the Godhra train carnage illegal and
unconstitutional. It restrained the Centre from tabling the committee report in Parliament or
taking any further action on it. The Shah-Nanavati Commission of Inquiry, constituted in
2002 to inquire into the Godhra train carnage and the pogrom that followed subsequently, is
yet to submit its final report. However, several gaps in the “conspiracy theory” of the Gujarat
government have been pointed out to the Commission since there is no real evidence that
there was any sort of Muslim conspiracy to set the train on fire. See “Godhra Incident: Chinks
in Conspiracy Theory”, http://www.rediff.com/news/2006/dec/05godhra.htm.
NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NAT’L HUM. RTS. COMM’N: (20022003) [hereinafter NHRC REPORT]. The carnage also resulted in 1,13,000 Muslims living in
relief camps with thousands more displaced in various other ways. The economic loss
inflicted on the Muslim community amounted to a staggering 38,000 million rupees. 250
mosques and ‘dargahs’ were demolished, signifying that the attack was aimed at destroying
the community as a whole.
7
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“genocide”.8 Thus, Gujarat has been selected as an appropriate case-study of
transitions from incidents of large-scale violence to peace within purportedly
democratic states. The author enquires into whether the transitional
mechanisms designed by societies like South Africa which underwent
“paradigm transitions” lend themselves to useful application in Gujarat.
The author starts by pointing out the limitations of an exclusively
retribution-based approach to transitions in Section I. Reconciliation, a broader
concept encompassing both truth and justice, has been presented as an
alternate, wider approach in Section II. It has first been understood in the
Hegelian sense and then its importance to transitions has been briefly outlined.
Section III focuses on a popular reconciliatory mechanism, the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, by adopting the South African model as a
workable example. Section IV makes a shift from the discussion of paradigm
transitions to an examination of “conflicted democracies” and the unique
concerns for transitions therein. The author argues that there is a pressing need
to demand institutional transformation instead of being content with slow and
incremental reform that is normal in most democracies. In particular, the author
suggests that it would be worthwhile to consider the ‘Truth and Reconciliation
Commission’ as a mechanism to bring about this institutional transformation in
“conflicted democracies” as well. Section V looks at Gujarat against the
theoretical background established in the previous sections and concludes that
it is, indeed, a conflicted democracy. The utility of considering the possibility
of creating a Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Gujarat follows as a
necessary corollary.

I. Isn’t Retribution Enough?
The positivist orientations of international law lend criminal prosecutions a
place of central importance in any discussion on achieving justice in the
aftermath of genocidal violence.9 Convicting perpetrators for the abuse of
human rights is often viewed as the only real means of “doing justice”;
INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVE FOR JUSTICE IN GUJARAT, THREATENED EXISTENCE - A FEMINIST ANALYSIS
GENOCIDE IN GUJARAT (2003). [hereinafter IIJ REPORT]. The People’s Union for Civil
Liberties has labeled the carnage as genocide. See also PUCL REPORT, supra note 5.
8

OF THE

The events comprising the Gujarat carnage of 2002 also satisfy the definition of genocide in
Article 4, Statute of the ICTR. See also the judgment of the International Criminal Tribunal
for former Yugoslavia in Prosecutor v. Jelesic, IT-95-10 ICTY, ¶ 83. The Trial Chamber
noted that it is accepted that genocide may be perpetrated in a limited geographic zone.
9

Kritz, supra note 3.
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allocating punishment to those who justly deserve it. Furthermore, by making
examples of the major perpetrators through the drama of courtroom trials,
criminal prosecutions are said to be the most effective deterrent to similar
abuses in the future.10 While we must acknowledge that criminal prosecutions
have an important role to play in achieving justice and maintaining social
order, it is submitted that it is necessary for us to re-think the monolithic
approach towards the achievement of peace and justice that they seem to
suggest. In other words, even if we accept that criminal prosecutions are an
important component of justice-delivery in the aftermath of genocidal violence,
is retribution all there is to justice? And even if criminal convictions serve as a
deterrent to the commission of future atrocities, are they a permanent and
lasting guarantee against similar violent confrontations?
i. An expanded meaning of “justice”

Perhaps there can be no real answer to the first question of whether
retribution is exhaustive of justice, since the very notion of “justice” is an
elusive one, incapable of an a priori, objective determination. Still, the need to
achieve “justice”, as perceived by various wronged parties in a situation of
conflict, is real if one is serious about the commitment to peace. Let it therefore
suffice to point out that amongst the myriad perceptions of justice, ‘retributive
justice’ is but one such perception, albeit one worthy of attention. Professor
Charles Villa-Vicencio identified at least five different forms that justice could
take including deterrent justice, compensatory justice, rehabilitative justice and
justice as the affirmation of human dignity.11 To insist on retribution as the only
10

The mandates of the international tribunals set up in Yugoslavia or Rwanda are illuminative
in this regard. Article 1 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia, adopted on May 25th, 2003, states that the said Tribunal shall have the power to
prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law
committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia including genocide. Similarly, the Statute
of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, in its preamble, expresses grave concern at
the reports indicating that genocide and other systematic, widespread and flagrant violations
of international humanitarian law have been committed in Rwanda and considers the ICTR as
a means of putting an end to such crimes. It further reiterates the conviction that “the
prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law
would enable this aim to be achieved and would contribute to the process of national
reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance of peace..” and the belief that “the
establishment of an international tribunal for the prosecution of persons responsible for
genocide and the other above-mentioned violations of international humanitarian law will
contribute to ensuring that such violations are halted and effectively redressed”. Article 1,
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,
Charles Villa-Vicencio, Why Perpetrators Should Not Always Be Prosecuted (manuscript)
at 12 cited from Kader Asmal, Truth, Reconciliation and Justice: The South African
Experience in Perspective 63(1) MOD. L. REV. 1 (2000) [hereinafter Asmal].
11
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means of effecting justice is, therefore, unimaginative at best and profoundly
inaccurate at worst. In South Africa, for instance, the injustice of apartheid had
social, economic and political dimensions Criminal trials could not address the
entire edifice of apartheid. Justice required, inter alia, the correction of a
skewed socio-economic legacy and redistribution of resources.12
ii. Prosecutions and future peace

The second question raised was whether criminal prosecutions are sufficient
to ensure lasting peace in the future. The author contends that criminal
prosecutions alone cannot bring about a successful transition to peace. They
form one piece in the larger “peace jigsaw” that is required to be cobbled
together. They contribute to peace to the extent that they might prevent persons
and communities whose rights have been abused from taking matters into their
own hands and triggering fresh waves of counter-violence. This is not very
different from the role criminal law generally plays in maintaining social order.
However, criminal prosecutions alone are not successful in addressing the
unique difficulties that the mass violation of human rights or genocidal
violence throws up. Criminal prosecutions alone are incapable of addressing
the underlying causes of such mass-violence- economic, social or cultural- and
thus cannot attempt the complex process of rebuilding relationships at the
individual and community levels.13 The rebuilding of past relationships in turn
is necessary for the most minimal conception of peace, namely, coexistence. In
societies which are additionally undergoing a regime change (from an
authoritarian regime to a democratic set-up for instance), the process of
rebuilding relationships assumes even greater importance in enabling formerly
antagonistic parties to participate together in the new, democratic structures
that are being created.14
iii. Practical constraints of criminal prosecution in the aftermath of genocide

12

Id.

See generally, R.atna Kapur, Normalizing Violence: Transitional Justice and the Gujarat
Riots, 15 COLUMBIA J. GENDER & L. (2006) [hereinafter Kapur], where the author points out
that the primary focus of transitional justice has been killings, abductions, disappearances etc.
She argues that this overly legalistic approach fails to recognize that institutional
arrangements and structures are deeply implicated in the production of such harm. In fact, the
normalization of the violence of the Gujarat riots was partly a product of the legal, political
and religious discursive practices of the Hindu Right.
13

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRACY AND ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, RECONCILIATION AFTER
VIOLENT CONFLICT- A HANDBOOK 17 (D. Bloomfield et al eds., 2003) [hereinafter RECONCILIATION
HANDBOOK].
14
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Finally, the prosecution program invariably comes up against huge practical
difficulties that paralyze its potential to serve either of the functions discussed
above. Reverting to the South African scenario, prosecutions were practically
impossible, given that there was no victor from either side of the negotiators. A
compromise had to be made between the international demand for prosecution
of perpetrators of gross human rights violations and the national appeal for
peaceful transition, reconciliation and justice.15
The case of Rwanda also demonstrates the need for pragmatism to temper
an absolutist approach to prosecution. In one of the most horrific genocidal
massacres in recent memory, up to one million Rwandan Tutsis and moderate
Hutus were brutally slaughtered in just fourteen weeks in 1994. Throughout
their first year in office, many senior members of the new government insisted
that every person who participated in the atrocities should be prosecuted and
punished. This approach, however, would put more than 100,000 Rwandans on
trial, a situation that would be wholly unmanageable and certainly
destabilizing. To compound the problem, the criminal justice system of
Rwanda was decimated during the genocide, with some ninety-five percent of
the country's lawyers and judges either killed or currently in exile or prison. By
mid-1997, some 115,000 Rwandans were detained in prisons built to house a
fraction of that number on allegations of involvement in the genocide, while
the national Ministry of Justice still had just seven attorneys on its staff.16 The
International Criminal Tribunal in Rwanda (ICTR) set up under the UN
auspices in 1994, is another forum for undertaking criminal prosecutions in
relation to the genocide. The Tribunal, in strictly adhering to the due process
rights of the accused, has been painfully slow in undertaking trials. Since it
began hearing cases in 1996, the ICTR has heard only 33 cases completely.17
In Gujarat too, the nature and scale of the communal violence in 2002 puts
the criminal justice system under severe strain. The first problem faced by the
Prosecution relates to the First Information Reports (FIR) lodged with the
Gujarat police while the riots were occurring. Several witnesses have testified
that lodging FIRs was made as difficult for them as possible by the police. It
Phenyo Tshenolo Keiseng Rakate, Dealing with the Hatchet of the Past: A Critique of the
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report, 40(3) INDIAN J. INT’L L. 547
(2000) [hereinafter Rakate].
15

Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Law Prevent Future
Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 7 (2001).
16

For
current
information
on
the
http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/cases/status.htm.
17

status
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cases,

see

generally,
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has also been recorded that the police very often did not register the case
against those named by the victims.18 In some cases, the police themselves
lodged the FIR before private parties could do so in order to control the
investigation. The FIRs are thus devoid of the details required for a successful
prosecution of the case.19 The trial of the numerous cases registered has also
encountered several problems and has failed to punish the perpetrators in a
speedy and effective manner.20 Even five years after the carnage, the number of
convictions remains abysmally low.21 Some of the cases tried by the “fast-track
courts” set up in Gujarat to try the riots cases have had to be retried on account
of bias.22
Perhaps the claim that justice in situations of mass-atrocities requires a
creative approach is now better contextualized. Any effective system of
transitional justice must take into account the staggeringly large number of

18

CITIZENS FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE, CONCERNED CITIZEN’S TRIBUNAL, GUJARAT 2002: AN
GUJARAT (2003).

ENQUIRY

INTO THE CARNAGE IN

For instance, in Naroda Patiya (one of the areas that was worst-affected by the communal
violence), the FIR lodged by the police covers a duration of 9 hours and a range of events in
different locations. The FIR is an omnibus collection of cognizable offences, providing no
clear demarcations under which the investigation may be carried out. The FIR is flawed
because it does not provide any details about the individual crimes themselves- the timing,
location and so on. Most of the FIRs lodged begin with a description of the Godhra event and
the wording of the FIR makes it appear that the violence was a justified retaliation against the
Godhra tragedy- an indication of the subjective viewpoint from which the investigation was
carried out. The uniform wording of the FIRs across the state also hints at there being orders
from political superiors to register the cases in such a manner. See Vrinda Grover, The
Elusive Quest for Justice in GUJARAT-THE MAKING OF A TRAGEDY 356 (2002).
19

Most of the 5,067 rioters who were arrested, causing the Sabarmati Central Jail authorities
to look for additional space to accommodate them, have now been released on bail. A total of
691 cases were filed, of which 414 have now been deemed 'without merit.' A year after the
riots, there were 508 cases pertaining to the riots pending trial. The recommendations of the
NHRC to appoint the Central Bureau of Investigation to look into these crimes have not been
accepted by the Government. See The Gujarat Riots: A Year Later, February 26, 2003
available
at
The
Gujarat
Riots
Homepage,
http://www.rediff.com/news/2006/dec/05godhra.htm.
20

Azim
Khan
Sherwani,
Gujarat
four
years
later,
http://indianmuslims.in/aankhen-ab-bhi-nam-hain-gujarat-four-years-later.
21

available

at

For instance, in the Best Bakery case, in which 14 innocent persons were burnt alive in the
said bakery in an act of premeditated venom, the Fast Track Court set up at Vadodra to try the
case summarily acquitted all the accused. The case was retried by the Supreme Court which,
in 2006, convicted 9 of the 21 accused. Thus retribution took almost 5 long years to achieve.
The case became extremely controversial on account of one of the key prosecution witnesses,
Zaheera Sheikh, turning hostile and giving inconsistent testimonies to the Court. She was
sentenced to one year’s imprisonment by the Supreme Court for perjury. See Zahira Sheikh v.
State of Gujarat, (2004) 4 SCC 158.
22
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potential cases and the overwhelmingly small number of available personnel to
process them.23
In the light of the limited potential of retribution-based solutions to massabuse of human rights as discussed above, this article argues that there is a
compelling justification for considering alternate approaches towards effecting
such transitions. The philosophical underpinnings of reconciliation, as an
alternate approach, have been discussed in the following section, hoping to
provide the necessary background for finally exploring the reconciliatory
approach as a useful option in Gujarat.

II. Philosophical Underpinnings of Reconciliation
i. Reconciliation

The term ‘reconciliation’ is used to signify two distinct phenomena. It can
be used to denote both a goal and a process. As a goal, it remains largely
aspirational; a state of things towards the attainment of which we direct present
efforts. As a process, it refers to a “present-tense way of dealing with things”24,
designed to achieve that final goal.
It might be useful to invoke Hegel’s concept of reconciliation at this stage.
In his conceptualization, ‘reconciliation’ or ‘Versohnung’ is the process of
overcoming conflict, enmity, alienation or estrangement; the result is the
restoration of a state of harmony, unity, peace or friendship. 25 The concept of
‘Versohnung’ strongly connotes a process of transformation. When two parties
become versohnt, they do not resume their old relationship unchanged. Instead
they do so by changing their behaviour and attitudes in fundamental ways.26
Thus, societies emerging from major civil strife or from the brutality of
oppressive regimes attempt (or ought to attempt) reconciliation. The violence
of the past often does not allow them to resume pre-conflict relationships as
they existed- a fundamental change is required. For instance, it is extremely
unlikely that members of ethnic or religious minorities, whose rights have been
violated by their former neighbours or friends from an opposite group, will be
23

Kritz, supra note 3.

24

RECONCILIATION HANDBOOK,

supra note 14.

M. O. HARDIMON, HEGEL’S SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY- THE PROJECT
[hereinafter HARDIMON].
25

26

Id.

OF

RECONCILIATION 93 (1994
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able to resume their old friendship after the conflict, unchanged. Any process
of transition must, therefore, aim at affecting transformation of the old
relationships through a whole-hearted confrontation and acceptance of the past.
However, it is important to note that reconciliation does not signify the total
absence of conflict or a state of perfect harmony. Hegel too maintains that
conflict and antagonism are integral components of reconciliation with the
social world. It is crucial only that any process of reconciliation eliminates
“fundamental contradictions” or fundamental conflicts that make coexistence
impossible.27 Simply put, reconciliation means finding a way to live alongside
former enemies- not necessarily to love them or forget the past- but to coexist
with them to a degree sufficient to share our society with them and participate
together in building democratic institutions and processes.28
To some, reconciliation seems to suggest ‘resignation’ or acceptance of
defeat, a tendency to overlook or ignore the atrocities committed in the past.
Reconciliation is then posited as being the antithesis of justice (taking the
guilty to task). In actuality, reconciliation is none of this. Hegel clarifies this by
stating that it is impossible to be resigned to a particular circumstance while
being versohnt to it- the latter requires a wholehearted acceptance of the
situation, ridden as it may be with imperfections, rather than a quiet submission
to the powers that be.29 Thus reconciliation is not an excuse for impunity or an
exercise in “forgetting”. It does not stand opposed to either truth or justice.
Oftentimes, retributive justice achieved through the mechanism of courts might
be necessary to achieve reconciliation. In fact, reconciliation is an overarching
process that includes both truth and justice as necessary elements but not as its
only ingredients.30
Understandably, the process of reconciliation is likely to be long-drawn,
taking decades or even generations to fulfill its goal. It must necessarily
comprise short-term and long-term measures directed towards changing
attitudes, prejudices, emotions, perceptions of history and so on. This includes
truth commissions, reparations etc. in the short term, and education,
retrospective apologies etc. in the longer term.

27

Id.

28

RECONCILIATION HANDBOOK,

29

HARDIMON, supra note 25.

30

RECONCILIATION HANDBOOK,

supra note 14, at 21.
supra note 14.

Vol. 3

Socio-Legal Review

2007

Reconciliation can take place at many levels. It can take place between
fighting individuals, between individuals and the state as well as between entire
communities that are at war with each other. Therefore, in the context of
transitional justice, reconciliation will also have to occur at the level of such
warring factions or communities.31
ii. Truth

It might appear that reconciliation is achieved far more easily by ignoring
the truth about the past than by scrupulously arriving at it. Truth-telling is even
perceived as actually hindering the process of reconciliation, based on the
belief that “digging up the past” and “reopening old wounds” stand in the way
of overcoming past conflicts and differences. This is especially true when
violence has ceased due to political settlements entered into by warring parties
and the balance of convenience lies in favour of “letting bygones be
bygones”.32
Some scholars argue that there is no necessary connection between truth
and reconciliation. Priscilla Hayner, for example, points this out in the context
of Mozambique where she believes that reconciliation is best achieved through
silence. In the context of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Sierra
Leone, Tim Kessal has argued that in some societies such as the community in
Tonkolili, Sierra Leone, ‘ritual’ as opposed to “truth-telling” is far more
effective in achieving reconciliation. This observation was based upon a study
of the working of the TRC in Tonkolili. He contends that while the practice of
confession and psychotherapy and psychoanalysis, its secular counterparts,
have been culturally embedded in the West, they are marginal to the unique
cultural imperatives in Sierra Leone.33 Further arguments against truth-telling
have been looked at in Section IV while assessing the criticism of the South
African TRC.
Yet we find that, in general, truth-telling is considered an integral
component of any post-conflict program of reconstruction and many countries
today have set up commissions by the name ‘Truth and Reconciliation
Commission’. The rationale is that it is practically impossible to be ‘reconciled’
i.e. move from a divided past to a shared future without acknowledging the

31

RECONCILIATION HANDBOOK,

supra note 14.

32

RECONCILIATION HANDBOOK,

supra note 14, at 26.

Tim Kelsall, Truth, Lies, Ritual: Preliminary Reflections on the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission in Sierra Leone 27(2) HUM. RTS. Q. 361 (2002).
33
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injuries suffered due to atrocities committed in the past. 34 The fissures caused
by past violence are indeed real, and justifiably so. Any reconciliation that is
achieved by a forced closure of these wounds shall necessarily be short-lived.
Tina Rosenberg, a journalist who has written extensively on this topic, says: “If
the victims in a society do not feel that their suffering has been acknowledged,
then they . . . are not ready to put the past behind them. If they know that the
horrible crimes carried out in secret will always remain buried . . . then they are
not ready for reconciliation”. She adds, “The kind of reconciliation that lets
bygones be bygones is not true reconciliation. It is reconciliation at gunpoint
and should not be confused with the real thing”.35
Understood in this way, it becomes clear that reconciliation is crucial to
rebuilding societies transitioning to lasting peace and democracy. Its
importance is twofold. First, reconciliation, however achieved, is the only way
of ensuring that the violent conflict does not erupt again and peace is not
threatened. Second, while politics might be useful in arriving at compromises
or settlements, such settlements are on shaky ground until politicians realize
that they need to address the larger attitudes of the communities they represent
towards each other for the implementation of political decisions for peace.

III. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs) are instituted on the premise
that truth lies at the heart of reconciliation. Although their exact structure and
functioning varies depending upon the political and social context of the
society undergoing transition, the broad goals and morality of TRCs remains
more or less constant. In the twenty first century, several truth commissions
have been set up in diverse locations, with the number only increasing.36 The
The argument in favour of “amnesia” is based upon utilitarian principles, i.e. an action must
be judged by its benefit to the society as a whole. Thus the demands of the abused for a
reckoning with their perpetrators may perhaps be set aside if in doing so the greater good of
society will somehow be achieved. This is particularly argued when the political-historical
fault lines run deep and it is nearly impossible to establish the “truth” about the past.
However, it is submitted that the concept of “benefit” to society requires critical examination.
It cannot be restricted to economic benefits or greater power in international relations. The
concept of benefit must also emphasize the consolidation of the democratic process and a
nation’s sense of its own moral self worth. This is usually better achieved by a frank
reckoning with the past. See Stephen A. Garrett, Models of Transitional Justice - A
Comparative Analysis, International Studies Association, 41st Annual Convention, Los
Angeles (March 2000), available at http://www.ciaonet.org/isa/gas02.
34

RECONCILIATION HANDBOOK,

35

supra note 14.

For instance, TRCs have been set up in South Africa, Sierra Leone, El Salvador, Cambodia,
Guatemala, and Zimbabwe.
36
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TRC in South Africa has been widely hailed as one of the “success stories” of
truth telling as an effective means of transitional justice. This article thus
examines the general structure, functions and impact of TRCs using the South
African model. The author recognises that the South African TRC is neither the
only model that could have been studied- indeed TRCs have been differently
designed and implemented in several countries in the past decade- nor is it a
model that is free from imperfections. However, since a comparative analysis
of TRCs cannot be accommodated into the present study and the South African
model would suffice as a working model for the limited purposes of this article,
it has been chosen for a more detailed study.
i. South African TRC- Structure and Functions

The South African TRC was set up under the 1995 Promotion of National
Unity and Reconciliation Act (hereinafter “the PNURC Act”). The Act
established a commission with the objective of promoting national unity and
reconciliation in a spirit of understanding which transcends the conflicts and
divisions of the past.37 The said objective was to be achieved, inter alia, in the f
ollowing ways• The establishment of as complete a picture as possible of the causes,
nature and extent of the gross violations of human rights including
the antecedents, circumstances, factors and context of such
violations, as well as the perspectives of the victims and the motives
and perspectives of the persons responsible for the commission of
the violations, by conducting investigations and holding hearings.38
The Committee on Human Rights Violations was set up primarily for
this purpose.39
• Facilitating the granting of amnesty to persons who make full
disclosure of all the relevant facts relating to acts associated with a
“political objective”.40 An Amnesty Committee was set up for this
purpose.41

37

PNURCA, 2005, Art. 3(1).

38

PNURCA, 2005, Art. 3(1)(a).

39

Chapter III of NURC deals with the Committee on Human Rights Violations.

40

PNURCA, Art. 3(1)(b).

41

Chapter IV of NURC deals with matters pertaining to amnesty.
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• Establishing and making known the fate or whereabouts of victims
and by restoring the human and civil dignity of such victims by
granting them an opportunity to relate their own accounts of the
violations of which they are the victims, and by recommending
reparation measures in respect of them.42 A Committee on
Reparations and Rehabilitations was set up for this purpose.43
• Compiling a report providing a comprehensive account of the
activities and findings of the Commission and which contains
recommendations of measures to prevent the future violations of
human rights.44
The Human Rights Violations Committee conducted victim hearings and
took over 21000 statements.45 The Reparations and Rehabilitation Committee
facilitated the reconciliation process and promised to pay reparations to all the
designated victims. Over 7000 applications for amnesty were submitted for
crimes committed between 1960 and 1994.46 The TRC submitted its fivevolume report to President Nelson Mandela detailing the nature and extent of
the gross human rights violations that South Africa suffered from 1960 until
1994, during the apartheid regime.
ii. Evaluation of the South African TRC

The strongest criticism of truth commissions has been that their amnesty
processes represent “a fundamental subversion of the rule of law”.47 For some,
truth-telling was synonymous with impunity for gross violation of human rights
and, therefore, undermined respect for the law and legal institutions. The South
African TRC was the first initiative that attempted to answer this criticism by
laying down a unique process for amnesty, reparations and truth-telling.
First, it was the only the TRC that had the power to grant amnesty to
individual perpetrators, subject to certain conditions. No blanket impunity was
created. It forged a middle ground between blanket group-based amnesty and
42

PNURCA, Article 3(1)(c).

43

Chapter V of NURC deals with the Committee on Reparation and Rehabilitation.

44

PNURCA, Article 3(1)(e).

THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA, THE TRUTH
COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA REPORT (1999) at Chapter 6, ¶ 5.
45

AND

RECONCILIATION

Anurima Bhargava, Defining Political Crimes: A Case Study of the South African Truth
and Reconciliation Commission, 102(4) COLUM. L. REV. 1309 (2002) [hereinafter Bhargava].
46

47

Id.
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the infeasibility of prosecuting all offenders of a previously unjust regime. The
amnesty process sought to establish the truth about past offences, especially
with regard to the motives of the perpetrators; deter future violence by creating
a clear picture of all those who engaged in political violence; and even in the
absence of formal punishment, it sought to establish accountability of
perpetrators for crimes they committed.
Secondly, the TRC, unlike other initiatives, conducted its hearings in public
before a panel of commissioners. These hearings served to educate the public
about the past.48Also, individual persons were required to come forward on
their own accord and publicly acknowledge their responsibility for past crimes.
In a sense, the shame, guilt, embarrassment and social ostracization that
accompanied such confessions can themselves be viewed as serious
consequences attaching to past wrongs.
Thirdly, the TRC was represented as a quasi-judicial institution. Unlike past
truth commissions, its mandate was not merely to collect facts and compile
them in the form of reports. The amnesty process was conducted in a manner
akin to a criminal trial. The committee was given greater evidentiary, search
and seizure and investigative powers than most truth commissions. Decisions
of the TRC were subject to review by outside courts. The enabling Act itself
laid down detailed procedures and standards for the determination of whether
amnesty should be granted or not. Many of such standards borrowed from other
international law contexts and this lent a certain amount of legitimacy to the
process adopted.49
While in theory, the TRC was a commendable and ground-breaking
achievement, its actual working has come under some criticism. For instance, it
is argued that the Amnesty Committee was required to determine which crimes
were committed with a ‘political objective’ based on six different criteria.50
The hearings were also broadcasted on television to enable wider dissemination of the
information being gathered by the TRC.
48

49

Kapur, supra note 13.

PNRUCA, Art. 20(3) sets out the six criteria for determining whether a particular act was
associated with a political objective as follows:
50

(a) The motive of the person who committed the act, omission or offence;
(b) the context in which the act, omission or offence took place, and in particular
whether the act, omission or offence was committed in the course of or as part of a
political uprising, disturbance or event, or in reaction thereto;
(c) the legal and factual nature of the act, omission or offence, including the gravity
of the act, omission or offence;
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However, the Committee focused exclusively on the criteria of “whether the
act, omission or offence was committed in the execution of an order of, or on
behalf of, or with the approval of, the organization, institution, liberation
movement or body of which the person who committed the act was a member,
an agent or a supporter”. It is contended that this undermined the goals of the
amnesty process since it clouded inquiry into the truth about the perpetrators’
motives, politicized the process of creating a common record of apartheid’s
past and also failed to take into account the totality of circumstances (beyond
the relationship of the perpetrator to his political organization) to better reflect
the larger context in which the crimes were committed.51 Various other grounds
have also been used by various scholars of transitional justice to criticize the
working of the TRC.52 A detailed enquiry into the validity, or lack thereof, of
such criticism is not the concern of this article. It is only intended that in
examining the South African TRC as a possible model of transitional justice to
be applied to other situations of conflict such as Gujarat, one should be aware
that the neither the adoption of the TRC model nor its later functioning were
entirely uncontroversial, and such criticisms must be considered while
designing subsequent models of transitional justice.
However, the question of whether the TRC, notwithstanding some serious
critiques, was at all successful in promoting the goals of transitional justice is
indeed of great relevance to the present enquiry. In this regard, there is a fair
(d) the object or objective of the act, omission or offence, and in particular whether
the act, omission or offence was primarily directed at a political opponent or State
property or personnel or against private property or individuals;
(e) whether the act, omission or offence was committed in the execution of an order
of, or on behalf of, or with the approval of, the organisation, institution, liberation
movement or body of which the person who committed the act was a member, an
agent or a supporter; and
(f) the relationship between the act, omission or offence and the political objective
pursued, and in particular the directness and proximity of the relationship and the
proportionality of the act, omission or offence to the objective pursued, but does not
include any act, omission or offence committed by any person who acted(i) for personal gain: Provided that an act, omission or offence by any person who
acted and received money or anything of value as an informer of the State or a
former state, political organisation or liberation movement, shall not be excluded
only on the grounds of that person having received money or anything of value for
his or her information; or
(ii) out of personal malice, ill-will or spite, directed against the victim of the acts
committed.
51

See Bhargava, supra note 47.

See generally, Rakate, supra note 15, for a critique of the TRC from an international law
standpoint.
52
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degree of consensus that the TRC has been fairly successful in at least two
ways. First, in its “backward-looking function” of documenting and dealing
with the gross human rights violations of the past. Secondly, in its “forward
looking function” of building a culture that is respectful of human rights and
thereby preventing future tyranny.53 This means that the TRC has not only
impacted institutional actors in their attitudes towards human rights but has
also impacted the beliefs, values and attitudes of ordinary citizens. As Kader
Asmal rightly points out, “[f]or countries like South Africa, where the legacy is
a particularly appalling institutionalized and society-wide one, the real value of
truth commissions lies in their impact on the social consensus”54.
It is apt to add here, as a matter of caution, the reminder that the TRC must
not be viewed as a panacea for the complex problems that persist in societies
emerging from violent conflict. Its mandate is to help in the immediate
transition of society from war/conflict to peace by enabling a society to
effectively deal with its past. It is, therefore, unreasonable to burden its already
heavy mandate with an expectation of an overall and lasting solution to
conflict. It cannot be a substitute to long term measures such as education,
memory sustenance and so on. I hope, however, that a more humble case has
been made- that the TRC has the potential to confront past abuses of human
rights and prevent, to some extent future tyranny.

IV. “Conflicted Democracies” vis-à-vis “Paradigm
Transitions” – Unique Concerns for Transitional Justice
The previous section described the model of the South African TRC which
evolved in the context of a paradigm transition. This immediately raises the
question of the applicability of any such mechanism of transitional justice to
Gujarat since the latter is located within a democratic state that purportedly has
institutions such as an independent and impartial judiciary, a free press and the
rule of law which can deal effectively with human rights violations. This
See generally, James L. Gibson, Truth, Reconciliation, and the Creation of a Human Rights
Culture in South Africa, 38(1) LAW & SOC’Y REV. 7 (2004). The author focuses on one
particular aspect of human rights namely, the commitment to universalism (versus
particularism) in the application of the rule of law. He concludes, through theoretical and
empirical analysis, that although South Africa remains quite a distance from a culture in
which human rights are highly regarded among all segments of the mass public, the truth and
reconciliation process may well have contributed to creating a human rights culture in the
country.
53

54

Asmal, supra note 11, at 10.
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section examines the concept of a “conflicted democracy” and seeks to
establish the need for mechanisms for transitional justice, such as the TRC, in
such democracies. In essence the argument is that in non-paradigm transitions
such as Gujarat, the state itself is often inextricably linked to the violation of
human rights and this necessitates a different approach towards transition to
peace in such democracies.
i. “Conflicted Democracies” distinguished

An important distinction must be drawn between transitions involving a
shift from an authoritarian regime to a democratic regime on the one hand and
transitions from war/conflict to peace, not necessitating a regime change, on
the other. These are two distinct processes although in most “paradigm
transitions”,55 they tend to go hand in hand. The discourse on transitional
justice as a whole has been almost exclusively focused on the former variety of
transitions. This, it is submitted, can be attributed to an underlying assumption
that systematic human right violations are committed by states in authoritarian
regimes and, therefore, a transition to democracy must necessarily accompany
a transition to peace. However, this is a partly flawed assumption. A similar
legacy may manifest itself in states that have experienced prolonged structured,
communal, political violence, even when the political structures could be
broadly considered democratic. Such states have been termed as “conflicted
democracies”56. They are usually characterized by sharp divisions, ethnic,
religious, racial and so on, in the body politic. These divisions are so acute that
they have resulted in significant political violence. Transition in a conflicted
democracy will involve a transition from war to peace but not
straightforwardly, one from authoritarianism to democracy.
ii. The paradox of transition in a “conflicted democracy”

The distinction between “paradigm transitions” and “conflicted
democracies” is pertinent since conflicted democracies present a number of
paradoxes that create different issues for legal and political transformation.57
The core paradox is that conflicted democracies, like paradigm transitions, aim
at the achievement of a stable and peaceful democracy and are, therefore, faced
with a program of action that their self-definition renders unnecessary. This is
Paradigm transitions are transitions occurring from a violent, authoritarian regime to a
stable and democratic one. The democratization of South Africa in 1994 is one example. See
Campbell, supra note 4.
55

56

Campbell, supra note 4.

57

Campbell, supra note 4.
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because conflicted democracies already proclaim an ideological commitment to
democracy.
As a result, at the time of transition in conflicted democracies, there is much
less international pressure on the State to bring about radical political, legal and
social transformation as compared to paradigm transitions where there is
enormous international pressure for transformation. Furthermore, owing to its
democratic self-conception, there is less pressure on the institutions of a
conflicted democracy that were responsible for human rights violations to
transform; these institutions can far more effectively resist change. The
problem is further exacerbated by the fact that change in conflicted
democracies is slow and incremental while change in paradigm transitions is
perceived as happening in one monumental burst, corresponding to a transfer of
power or the signing of a peace settlement- when the State “turns over a new
leaf”58.The democratic nature of the State may, thus, make it more difficult for
the authorities to acknowledge past failings, and to recognize the problem of
institutional failure. This is also why the response of such states to genocidal
conflict has usually been to let the criminal law of the land take its course. The
transition is purely retributive since there is no demand for ‘transformation’ of
institutions and society.
iii. Legitimacy Gap & Deepening Democracy

Democracy has two dimensions to it- procedural and substantive.
Purportedly “democratic” states that conform to some minimal requirements of
procedural democracy (conduct of elections, for instance) might still fail to
attract the consent of, or repress, significant minorities and might thus fall short
in terms of substantive democracy.
Since the deficit in substantive democracy makes it possible for states in
conflicted democracies to violate the rights of minorities with impunity in the
conflict-situation necessitating transition, a second transition is necessary in
conflicted democracies (in addition to the first transition to peace). The second
transition is not from authoritarianism to democracy but from procedural or
nominal to substantive democracy; not by way of introducing democracy but in
deepening it.
This is of crucial importance because the failure of the State to prevent
human rights violations and its complicity in the same creates an “is”
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See generally, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GENOCIDE AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY (2004).
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legitimacy crisis i.e. legitimacy gap in the sociological sense.59 In the conflicted
democracy, law’s legitimacy no longer remains axiomatic. Rather, the law’s
complicity in human rights abuses (whether through the facilitation of abuse, or
in its failure to provide redress), can create a situation where, for communities
at the sharp end of violent conflict, confidence in law and in legal institutions
collapses.
The implications of this legitimacy gap or “legitimation paradox” for the
rule of law in conflicted democracies can be particularly acute.60 Hence, a
successful transition requires the building of the legitimacy of law and legal
communities amongst communities where the experience of exclusion has been
most pronounced.
iv. A demand for institutional transformation

It follows from the preceding discussion that there must be pressure- from
national and international quarters- for the state to undertake institutional
transformation instead of merely engaging with slow and incremental
democratic reform. It is as imperative in the context of transitions in conflicted
democracies as it is in the context of paradigm transitions.
In Section III the process of reconciliation was discussed as being a process
of ‘transformation’. The TRC model was further presented in Section IV as
being a mechanism to effect or facilitate this transformation. The author
therefore, submits that the TRC model ought to be seriously considered while
conflicted democracies are undergoing transition as a useful mechanism for
transformation. Only this will restore the legal and institutional legitimacy, that
has been displaced on account of their being co-opted by the State during the
conflict.

V. Truth and Reconciliation in Gujarat
Having established the utility of considering transformative mechanisms
such as the TRC as ways of effecting conflict-to-peace transitions within
“conflicted democracies”, this section focuses on Gujarat and explores “truth
There is a distinction between legitimacy in a normative sense- what is called “ought”
legitimacy- and legitimacy in the sociological sense- what is called “is” legitimacy. In
“ought” legitimacy , the state’s adherence to democratic standards (for instance its
employment of regular elections) may be taken to guarantee the legitimacy of its laws and
institutions. In the sociological sense, law’s legitimacy is tested by the perceptions of people
and society towards the law. See Campbell, supra note 4, at 189.
59
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Campbell, supra note 4, at 190.
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and reconciliation” as a means of effecting its transition to peace and stability
following the carnage of 2002. First, I argue that Gujarat is indeed a “conflicted
democracy”, based upon the theoretical discussion in the preceding section.
Secondly, the fact that the communal carnage was largely facilitated by the
state is established. Thirdly, the legitimacy crisis in Gujarat that has been
created as a consequence is examined. Finally, the proposal of establishing a
TRC in Gujarat is put forth.
i. Gujarat- a “conflicted democracy”

Gujarat is part of the Indian state that is avowedly democratic. The
Constitution of India61, and several other treaties and declarations that India is a
signatory to, affirms its ideological commitment towards democracy.62 It
displays the two major characteristics of a “conflicted democracy”. First, its
polity is deeply divided along communal lines. This is partly attributable to the
agenda of right-wing political organizations such as the Vishwa Hindu
Parishad. Through sustained and systematic propaganda, these fascist forces
have been at play for the past few decades and have risen to political power in
the nineties. They have been largely responsible for the rise of ‘Hindutva’ and a
division of the population along communal lines.63 The genocidal carnage of
2002 was not a spontaneous outburst. It was a reflection of pre-existing and
rapidly deepening fissures in society along communal lines.64
Second, these divisions were so acute as to result in significant violence.
Gujarat has a long history of communal riots, some of which have caused
significant loss of life and property. However, the extent of the damage became
visible only in 2002, in the unprecedented violation of human rights that took
place in Gujarat. Thus, Gujarat has seen the fulfillment of this criterion both in
the manner in which the violence has extended over a long period and in the
intensity it has demonstrated on occasion.

61

The Preamble to the Indian Constitution states:
“We the people of India, having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a
sovereign, socialist, secular, democratic republic...” (emphasis added).

See, for e.g., Article 29, Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Articles 21 and 22,
International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights.
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Batuk Vora, Horrendous Killings in Hindutva Lab after Godhra Carnage, 10 MAINSTREAM 5
(2002).
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Rajkumar Siwach, Social Tension and Communal Conflicts: Lessons from Gujarat, 48(3)
INDIAN J. OF PUB. ADMIN. 435 (2002) [hereinafter Siwach].
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ii. State role- the failure of Governance

The National Human Rights Commission signalled the role of the State in
the 2002 carnage in the following terms – “[t]here has been a comprehensive
failure of the State to protect the constitutional rights of the people of Gujarat,
starting with the tragedy in Godhra on 27 February 2002 and continuing with
the violence that ensued in the weeks that followed.”65 The role of the various
arms of the State machinery in allowing and actively contributing to
engineering and carrying out an operation of this sort has now been
conclusively established. The judgment of the Indian Supreme Court as well as
the reports of various non-governmental organisations and fact-finding
agencies have severely indicted the State for its complicity in carrying out
genocidal violence against its minority population, which it is constitutionally
mandated to protect.66
The role of the State was pervasive and visible in every aspect of the
carnage and in the sorry treatment meted out to the victims in the aftermath of
the genocide. Some examples are listed below to throw light on the role played
by the State forces in the ugly drama. The NHRC observed that in the light of
the history of communal violence in Gujarat, there was a failure of intelligence
and action by the State Government that marked the events leading to the
Godhra tragedy and the subsequent deaths and destruction that occurred.67
Before confirming the facts, the State Government released misinformation
implicating “Muslim frenetic mobs” in the tragedy. Groups of well-organized
persons were seen, armed with mobile telephones and addresses, singling out
certain homes and properties for death and destruction in certain districts —
sometimes within view of police stations and personnel.68 FIRs in various
instances were distorted or poorly recorded, and senior political personalities
were seeking to ‘influence’ the working of police stations by their presence
within them. For example, the police in several cases recorded “group FIRs”an omnibus of all the offences committed over a long period of time involving
several different victims and perpetrators. This made pinning individual
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NHRC REPORT, supra note 7.

NHRC REPORT, supra note 7; see also IIJ REPORT, supra note 8; Asghar Ali Engineer,
Gujarat Riots: Rushing to Judgment 38(16) ECON. & POL. WKLY 2115 (2003). The Supreme
Court has indicted the Gujarat government for its role in engineering the genocide in Zahira
Sheikh v. State of Gujarat, (2004) 4 S.C.C. 158.
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NHRC REPORT, supra note 7, at 23.
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Siwach, supra note 65, at 437.
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criminal responsibility close to impossible.69 The compensation rate fixed by
the State was grossly inadequate in most cases in addition to being highly
discriminatory. An amount of Rs.2 lakhs was announced as compensation to
the next-of-kin of the Hindu kar sevaks who died at Godhra while an amount of
Rs.1 lakh was announced for those Muslims who died in the subsequent
violence.70
Thus, it is clear that the State was responsible for committing systematic
violations of human rights in Gujarat. Dealing with this violent past gets
complicated by the fact that Gujarat is part of a “conflicted democracy”, that is,
the projected self-image of India as being the largest democracy in the world.
This impacted its transition in several ways.
First, there was very little international pressure for institutional
transformation. The serious nature of the attacks and their contravention of
international standards of human rights warrant an international response. Yet
the response from the international governments and other international
agencies like the UN and Special Rapporteurs has been almost absent. Very
few international governments and independent human rights bodies criticized
the Indian State in failing to provide for the victims of the violence. The image
of India as a “functioning democracy” has at times not allowed this
intervention and at other times the government of the day actively sought to
dissuade any ‘external intervention’. Bodies like Amnesty International
published reports71 on the carnage but were not permitted by the Central
Government to conduct fact-finding missions in Gujarat. Many appeals were
made to the concerned UN Special Rapporteurs and the UN High
Commissioner from various human rights groups but there has been no
effective response to this.{ reference} The main reason for such inaction is the
pressure exerted by the Indian government on the UN mechanisms to not
interfere in the ‘internal issues’ of India. For instance, the then Chairperson of
the NHRC met the then UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and
informed her that it was not necessary for her to visit India in the context of the
violence in Gujarat. Moreover, since most of these agencies can act only with
69

NHRC REPORT, supra note 7, at 292.
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NHRC REPORT, supra note 7, at 215.

AMNESTY INT’L, INDIA: JUSTICE, THE VICTIM – GUJARAT FAILS TO PROTECT WOMEN FROM VIOLENCE,
ASA 20/001/2005, available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engasa200292003. The
report focuses on the consistent failure of the state of Gujarat to fulfill its and obligations
under national and international law to exercise due diligence with regard to the state’s
Muslim minority, particularly girls and women.
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the permission from the respective governments, these options are difficult to
exercise when the State itself is complicit in the violence. In a globalized
world, international support from governments and civil society is vital for
sustained actions demanding accountability of elected governments within
countries and this was very inadequate in the case of Gujarat.
Second, the fact that Gujarat was part of a “conflicted democracy” resulted
in most demands being presented for reform of the existing systems. In other
words, the demands reflected the recognition that the process of change was
slow and incremental. Meanwhile, the planners and instigators of the violence
enjoyed total impunity; many of them continued to hold senior positions in the
police, bureaucracy and government.72
iii. Law and Legitimacy Crisis

The failure of the State to acknowledge past wrongs and the losses suffered
by the victims has greatly reduced the legitimacy of law in the state, especially
amongst those who have been seriously impacted by the communal violence
and have been unsuccessful in obtaining any redress. In fact, the complicity of
the State in causing them loss of lives and property and subsequently, in
actively denying them redress discourages the victims from banking on the
state to protect their rights. Indeed in Gujarat, a deep cynicism has set in as
regards the potential of law to be impartial and provide redress and recompense
to those whose rights have been violated.73
Legitimacy crisis, if it is deep enough, will sound the death knell of the rule
of law in a state. There is no hope of attaining sustainable peace in such
societies and the charged environment will give rise to similar events time and
again in the future.
Thus, there exists a compelling case for making ‘transformation’ and not
‘reform’ the goal of a system in transition from conflict to peace, even though
it is not strictly shifting from an authoritarian rule to a democratic regime. This
transformation can only occur with powerful mechanisms for confronting the
past and ensuring accountability of individual and state actors for past
For instance, the then Chief Minister of Gujarat, Narendra Modi, was reelected to office
mere months after the carnage. Backed by a significant section of the state administration and
even the bureaucrats at the Centre, Modi tried to paint a picture of strong leadership and
normalcy in Gujarat by conducting national and international extravaganzas in attempts to
woo the business world. See “Gujarat 2002 to 2007: The Aftermath of Genocide”, available
at http://www.sabrang.com/cc/archive/2007/june07/intro.html (Last visited July 12, 2007).
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atrocities. The TRC, as designed and implemented in South Africa, provides
several useful ideas in this regard. It establishes accountability through truthtelling and public confessions and apologies and also helps in achieving
restorative justice by awarding compensation and rehabilitation to the victims
of the violence. It is also important to remember that South Africa’s TRC
successfully combined criminal prosecutions of some of the worst offenders
with conditional amnesty. Gujarat too would require a similar combined
approach.
This is a project of national concern- genocidal incidents, such as the
Gujarat carnage, are responsible for the minority community as a whole
perceiving a threat from the State and the majority religion. This builds up a
consensus on the need to “protect themselves”- building up of the capacity to
fight. If the nation as a whole does not face the challenge of reconciliation head
on, the legitimacy crisis will render very real the threat of each of our human
rights being recklessly violated. While the reconciliation program must be
designed at the national level, the international community also ought to exert
pressure to ensure that it is done in a transparent and expeditious manner. There
is no reason for international bodies exerting their influence on situations of
regime change but not similar situations of conflict in democracies.
iv. TRC in Gujarat

There is no pre-determined formula for the creation of a Truth and
Reconciliation Commission. This article does not attempt to address the
enormous challenge of designing a Truth and Reconciliation Commission that
would be suited to the specific socio-economic and political context of Gujarat.
Several scholars74 and the United Nations75 have provided useful guidelines for
the construction of TRCs which can be the starting point for the creation of a
TRC in Gujarat.
The South African TRC can serve as a model for such a project since it was
the first TRC to combine individual accountability (through public hearings,
voluntary confessions and so forth) with a strong emphasis on restorative
justice (it had powers to award compensation and rehabilitation to the victims).
We must, of course, acknowledge the significant difference in the political
See, e.g., Priscilla Hayner, International Guidelines for the Creation and Operation of
Truth Commissions- A Preliminary Proposal, 59(4) LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 173 (1996).
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context of the transitions in Gujarat and South Africa. The latter involved a
clear regime change and a shift in the power bases whereas the former retained
the previous political regime almost in entirety. However, as has been argued
while discussing the need for institutional transformation in conflicted
democracies, there are sufficient parallels that one can draw between the two
kinds of transitions. Also, any such initiative in Gujarat will necessitate a much
larger, proactive role of civil society as was needed in South Africa to counter
an entrenched political regime in effecting transformation. Moreover, there are
some prima-facie indications that truth-telling would not be out of place in the
socio-cultural context of Gujarat. The author believes that on account of being
one of the epicentres of the freedom movement during colonial rule, Gujarat
has an ideological affinity for truth, one of the core philosophies of Gandhi’s
non-violent struggle. Initiatives for dialogue between the communities
undertaken by various non-governmental organizations following the 2002
carnage have reported fair degrees of success76- an indication that silence, as a
means of dealing with the past, is not a cultural preference. Even at the height
of the communal violence, the only areas to remain incident-free were those in
which peace-committees had been formed, comprising members of both
communities. These peace-committees ensured that the communication lines
were kept open day and night in those areas and provided truthful information
about the situation to residents. For instance, Dhokla, a town in Ahmedabad,
remained peaceful during the 2002 carnage despite being marked as a
communally sensitive area having witnessed communal violence on several
occasions in the past. This was possible because the residents formed peace
committees and resolved to communicate with each other instead of taking
impulsive action by joining divisive forces.77
It would be apt to also clarify the necessity for a TRC in the presence of the
National Human Rights Commission that has already done a considerable
amount of fact-finding. It is submitted that a comparison of the enabling act of
the NHRC, The Human Rights Act, 1993, with the National Unity and
Reconciliation Act under which the South African TRC was set up, would be
useful to indicate that the mandate and the powers of the two commissions is
very different. Of course, this does not preclude the TRC from working in
association with the NHRC in so far as their functions overlap. The
justification for designing a TRC, nevertheless, remains.
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Conclusion
This article began by highlighting the limitations, both philosophical and
pragmatic, of an exclusively retributive approach to transitional justice.
Reconciliation has been posited as a more apposite goal of any system
undergoing transition since it was seen as offering a real hope of preventing
future abuse of human rights on a mass scale. It was also contended that the
dichotomy that is often presented between ‘reconciliation’ and ‘justice’ is a
false dichotomy by understanding reconciliation as incorporating, not
opposing, a wider conception of justice than mere retribution. The Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, based on the idea of ‘reconciliation’ discussed
above, was examined through the South African TRC model. In evaluating its
potential to contribute to peace and deterrence of future human rights
violations, it was found that, although not immune from criticism, its
contribution in promoting a culture of human rights in South Africa cannot be
denied.
The latter half of the article unravelled the distinction between “paradigm
transitions” and transitions in “conflicted democracies”, and the implications of
that distinction. The core paradox presented by the latter category of transitions
is that it aims to fulfil the goal of a peaceful and stable democracy which, in its
own self-image, has already been achieved. In short, this means that the
democratic nature of “conflicted democracies” was itself an obstacle to the
achievement of peace. A nuanced understanding of transitions will allow us to
better address the legitimacy crises that are born when states in such
democracies make the uneasy transition to peace. This, in turn, will ensure that
both the national and international communities demand the ‘transformation’ of
institutions instead of “slow and incremental reform” in a self-satisfied
democracy.
The foregoing analysis squares up with the issue of communal violence in
Gujarat when we understand Gujarat as being a part of a “conflicted
democracy”. It justifies the claim that peace and stability can never be restored
without a dramatic institutional transformation including a meaningful
confrontation with the past. In this context, the possibility of the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission performing a transformative role was examined
and found to be an initiative worthy of serious consideration. Prima facie
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indications of the appropriateness of truth-telling in the specific socio-cultural
and historical context of Gujarat have been noted.
It is the final proposal of this article that serious thought must be given to
designing a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to address the transitional
paradoxes in Gujarat since it has serious implications for human rights and
Indian democracy as a whole.

